The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems: 
A Reminder of Module One

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The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

The Data-base of Module I

1. Micro-data

   Voter turnout and vote choice
   Party-identification and party- and leader-evaluation
   Candidate recognition and interaction with representatives
   Spatial issue-voting: Left-right orientation of citizens and parties
   Retrospective voting: Performance of the national economy
   Evaluation of democratic institutions and processes

2. Macro-data

   2.1 Electoral and party system variables

       --- district magnitude indicators
       --- disproportionality of the electoral system
       --- number of parties
       --- effective number of parties

   2.2 Structure and performance variables

       --- wealth and economic inequality
       --- ethnic structure and ethnic conflict
       --- political rights and civil liberties
       --- persistence of democracy
       --- electoral systems
       --- constitutional systems
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Countries and Elections Included in Module I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Australia 1996</th>
<th>Chile 1999</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand 1996</td>
<td>Mexico 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada 1997 without Quebec</td>
<td>Mexico 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with Quebec</td>
<td>Peru 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States 1996</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Belgium 1999 Flanders Wallonia | Belarus 2001 |
| Denmark 1998                    | Czech Republic 1996 |
| Germany 1998 West Germany East Germany | Hungary 1998 |
|                               | Lithuania 1997 |
| Netherlands 1998                | Poland 1997    |
| Norway 1997                     | Romania 1996   |
| Spain 1996                      | Russia 1999    |
| Spain 2000                      | Russia 2000    |
| Sweden 1998                     | Slovenia 1996  |
| Switzerland 1999                | Ukraine 1998   |
| Great Britain 1997 without Scotland |        |
|                               | Scotland       |
| Israel 1996                     |                |

| Japan 1996                      | Hong Kong 1998 |
| South Korea 2000                | Hong Kong 2000 |
| Taiwan 1995                     |                |
| Taiwan 1996                     |                |
| Thailand 2001                   |                |
Classification of Countries by Shugart and Carey’s Presidentialism – Parlamentarism Index

*Pure presidentialism*

Belarus  
South Korea  
Mexico  
Switzerland  
USA

*Premier – Presidential*

Lithuania  
Poland  
Romania  
Russia

*President – Parliamentary*

Ukraine

*Parliamentary With „President“*

Slovenia  
Taiwan

*Parliamentarism*

Australia  
Belgium  
Canada  
Czech Republic  
Denmark  
Germany  
Hungary  
Israel  
Japan  
Netherlands  
New Zealand  
Norway  
Spain  
Sweden  
Thailand  
United Kingdom

Hong Kong not classified
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Countries and Elections Grouped by Electoral Systems

PR: List

Belgium
Czech Republic
Denmark
Israel (parliament)
Netherlands
Norway
Poland (parliament)
Romania (parliament)
Slovenia (parliament)
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland

PR: List; Quota

Hong Kong

PR: Mixed Member / MMP

Germany

PR: Mixed Member / MMM

New Zealand

Mixed

Japan
South Korea (parliament)
Mexico (parliament)

Mixed / MMM

Hungary
Russia (parliament)
Ukraine (parliament)
Thailand

Semi-PR: Mix of Single Non-Transferable Vote and List Vote

Taiwan (parliament)
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Countries and Elections Grouped by Electoral Systems

Plurality / SMD

- Canada
- Mexico (president)
- Taiwan (president)
- USA (president; elected by a popular elected electoral assembly)
- Great Britain

Majority Preference / SMD

- Australia

Majority

- Belarus (president)
- Chile (president)
- Israel (prime minister)
- Lithuania (president)
- Peru (president)

^ Romania (president)
- Russia (president)
Structure of the Book

Part 1: The Project
Part 2: Electoral Participation
Part 3: Party Attachment
Part 4: Candidates
Part 5: Left-Right Orientation
Part 6: Parties, Candidates and Left-Right Orientation: Sincere and Strategic Voting
Part 7: Political Support
Electoral Participation

Jeffrey Karp and Susan Banducci
„Electoral Systems, Efficacy and Voter Participation“

Neil Nevitte, André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Richard Nadeau
„Socio-economic Status and Non-Voting: A Cross-National Comparative Analysis“

Hypotheses

1. Proportional representation systems (PR) encourage, plurality or first-past-the-post systems (FPP) discourage participation in elections. This proposition assumes that PR systems provide greater opportunities for the representation of the political interests of small party supporters and other political minorities.

2. Political representation of interests of small party supporters of other political minorities leads to a higher level of feeling of political efficacy.

3. The lower the level of individual socio-economic status (SES) the higher the level of non-voting in elections.

Results

The first two hypotheses which propose an impact of macro-conditions on individual behavior are confirmed. The third hypothesis which tests an individual level relationship controlling for economic and institutional macro-conditions is also confirmed. Although there is an effect of macro-conditions individual level socio-economic status remains a significant factor for electoral participation.
Party Attachment

Juan Diéz-Nicolás
„Party Attachment in Old and New Democracies“

Hermann Schmitt
„Multiple Party Identifications“

Hypotheses

1. The level of party attachment is higher in old and lower in new democracies. The longer the period of democratic history the higher the level of party attachment. This proposition assumes that individual-level party attachment develops over time as a consequence of citizens‘ experience with the political parties‘ performance.

2. Multiple party identification is lower in old and higher in new democracies. This proposition assumes that the nature of party attachment depends on the crystallization of the structure of the party system and the length of the electoral experience of citizens.

Results

The two hypotheses are confirmed. There is an impact of the length of the period of democratic history and the structure of the party system on the level and type of party attachments.
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Candidates

Sören Holmberg
„Candidate Recognition in Different Electoral Systems“

Yoshitaka Nishizawa
„Economic Voting: Do Institutions Affect the Way Voters Evaluate Incumbents?“

John Curtice and W. Phillips Shively
„Who Represents Us Best? One Member or Many?“

Hypotheses

1. Majoritarian electoral systems lead to higher candidate knowledge among citizens than proportional electoral systems. This proposition assumes a higher visibility and importance of candidates in plurality systems.

2. Economic voting has a higher impact on the incumbent candidate (or the incumbent political party) under institutional conditions which allow for an easy assessment of the accountability of politicians (or political parties). This proposition assumes that in presidential systems or under the condition of single-party government accountability is easier assessed than in parliamentary systems or coalition governments.

3. Representatives who are elected in single member constituencies are more likely to act as advocates on behalf of citizens than representatives who are elected in multi-member constituencies.

Results

The first two hypotheses are confirmed – at least to a certain degree. The third hypothesis is not confirmed. Although the level of contact between elected representatives and citizens is greater in countries with single number systems than in those with multi-number systems, this does not lead to any greater satisfaction with the operation of democracy.
Hypothesis

1. The relation of left-right party choice and individual-level left-right orientation is closer the higher the number of parties in a party system. This proposition assumes that there is a better fit between ideological „supply“ and „demand“ in multi-party systems.

Results

The hypothesis is confirmed even after controlling for a set of relevant individual-level characteristics.
Hypotheses

1. Voting is more driven by instrumental than expressive motivation in multi-party systems as compared to two-party systems.

2. The less constraint the electoral system and the more differentiated the party system the higher the degree of sincere voting.

3. The level of strategic voting is related to the size of the district magnitude. The smaller the district magnitude the higher the level of strategic voting.

Results

The first hypothesis awaits final test. The second hypothesis is confirmed for sincere party and sincere policy voting. It is not confirmed for sincere candidate voting. The third hypothesis is not confirmed. Systematic differences in the frequency of strategic voting resulting from variations in the institutional context are generally more pronounced at the district level across all electoral systems the smaller the particular district magnitude gets. This means that strategic voting in a particular polity is conditional on the type of the seat allocation system which defines how votes get translated into seats.
Political Support

Ola Listhaug, Bernt Aardal and Ingunn Opheim Ellis
„Institutional Variation and Political Support“

Radoslaw Markowski
„Diffuse Political Support in Old and New Democracies“

Jacques Thomassen and Henk van der Kolk
„Satisfaction with Democracy in Old and New Democracies“

Michele Claibourn and Virginia Sapiro
Gender Differences in Citizen-Level Aspects of Democratic Citizenship“

Hypotheses

1. Efficacy evaluations (which denotes voters’ evaluations of the system’s ability to respond to policy concerns) are more positive in systems that maximize representation. Authority evaluations (which denote voters’ evaluations of who is in power) are more important in systems that maximize accountability.

2. The legitimacy of new democracies is more vulnerable than the legitimacy of established democracies. This proposition assumes that new democracies have not yet been able to build up a reservoir of good will that might help them to survive shorter periods of time in which they cannot meet the expectations of their citizens.

Results

The first hypothesis is not confirmed. Effects of political institutions on political support are mixed. They do not demonstrate the superiority of either of the two institutional types. The second hypothesis is confirmed. The individual-level relation of perceived economic performance and satisfaction with the way democracy works is stronger in the new than in the old democracies. Therefore, satisfaction with democracy in new democracies seems to be somewhat more vulnerable to economic growth than satisfaction with democracy in established democracies.